Issues Arising in Institutional Litigation, part 7 of 8: Restraints

Restraints

Mechanical Restraints

Facilities vary in their use of mechanical restraints. Most juvenile facilities use handcuffs, but the use of four-point restraints or straitjackets is rare. In some facilities, a high incidence of restraint incidents results from inadequate staff training and overcrowding. In others, restraints are used to control mentally ill children or adult inmates or as a punitive measure for troublesome youth.

Freedom from bodily restraint is a protected liberty under Youngberg v. Romeo. Thus, in Garrett v. Rader, the mother of a retarded adult who died in restraints was entitled to bring an action claiming failure to properly hire and train staff and failure to correct conditions that had caused past abuse. One court has prohibited the restraint of children to a fixed object (see Pena v. New York State Division for Youth). The use of restraints as corporal punishment is unconstitutional under H.C. v. Hewett by Jarrard and Stewart v. Rhodes. Moreover, the use of restraints as a retaliatory device against inmates who displease correctional officers may violate the constitution (see Davidson v. Flynn).

Other courts dealing with the use of mechanical restraints have found that due process is violated unless recommended by a health professional (see Wells v. Franzen and O’Donnell v. Thomas on permitting restraint of a suicidal inmate and Jones v. Thompson on finding that use of three-way restraints on a suicidal inmate for a week, coupled with a failure to provide medical treatment or review and the absence of personal hygiene amenities, was unconstitutional). The U.S. Supreme Court permits the use of antipsychotic drugs as a form of medical restraint only where there is substantial due process protection for the inmate (see Washington v. Harper and Riggins v. Nevada).

There is some authority that restraints may be used for a limited period to prevent self-injury by a minor under Milonas v. Williams and Gary W. v. State of Louisiana. Such courts have also held that restraints may not be used for longer than 30 minutes without authorization from qualified professionals or institutional administrators (see Gary W. v. State of Louisiana and Pena v. New York Division for Youth).

Chemical Restraints

A few juvenile institutions have begun to use tear gas or pepper spray to restrain children. Although pepper spray alone may not cause death, it may pose serious danger for inmates who suffer from certain health conditions.

Although the use of chemical restraints has seldom been litigated in juvenile cases, at least two cases have found that the use of tear gas and mace on children who were troublesome, uncooperative, or unresponsive to staff violated the constitution (see Morales v. Turman, and State of West Virginia v. Werner). Similarly, Alexander S. v. Boyd found it improper to use tear gas on children to enforce orders.

Isolation

Most institutions use isolation for out-of-control individuals or as punishment for breaking rules. Even though isolation is commonly imposed as a sanction in juvenile institutions, some courts have found that children may be placed in isolation only when they pose immediate threats to themselves or others, that they must be monitored closely, and that they must be

released as soon as they have regained control of themselves.

Adult institutional case law on the use of isolation as punishment focuses on arbitrary placement in isolation, the length of time imposed, and conditions in the isolation room (see Harris v. Maloughney, McCray v. Burrell, and Lareau v. MacDougall). The cases, demanding that persons in isolation be afforded humane physical conditions and access to basic necessities such as showers and exercise, also apply to children. Children in isolation should be given books, writing materials, and articles of personal hygiene. What may be acceptable as punishment for adults may be unacceptable for children. Children have a very different perception of time (5 minutes may seem like an eternity), and their capacity to cope with sensory deprivation is limited. Thus, in Lollis v. New York State Department of Social Services, a 14-year-old status offender who got into a fight with another girl was placed in isolation in a 6- by 9-foot room for 24 hours a day, for 2 weeks. The court found this isolation to be unconstitutional.

Corporal Punishment

The wanton infliction of pain on prisoners violates the eighth amendment under Weems v. United States and Jackson v. Bishop. The use of excessive force by police or custodial officials violates the 14th amendment under Hewitt v. City of Truth or Consequences and Meade v. Gibbs. Torturing inmates to coerce information from them is also improper (see Cohen v. Coahoma County, Mississippi). Similarly, depriving an inmate of adequate food is a form of corporal punishment (see Cooper v. Sheriff,

Lubbock, Texas).

Due process

A huge body of law governs disciplinary due process in adult institutional cases, mostly in relation to administrative segregation or disciplinary transfers. The leading case, Wolff v. McDonnell, holds that inmates are entitled to these protections whenever “major” discipline is to be imposed (see Baxter v. Palmigiano). There must be evidence to support the finding of the disciplinary board.

During disciplinary proceedings, inmates are entitled to advance written notice of the charges against them, an opportunity to call witnesses and present evidence in their defense where permitting them to do so would not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals, an impartial decisionmaker, a written decision describing the evidence relied upon and the reasons for any disciplinary action taken, and a procedure for appealing the decision (see Hewitt v. Helm, Punte v. Real, and Sandin v. Conner).

Grievance procedures

Grievance procedures are important to children because they provide a means of addressing perceived injustices, and they thereby assist the rehabilitative process. They are also important to institutional administrators, since they provide information about abuses that

may be occurring. In cases involving adults, it is clear that the constitutional right to seek redress of grievances is violated if there is any retaliation against the prisoner for filing a grievance (see Dixon v. Brown). Similarly, grievance procedures may not place unreasonable restrictions on the language that may be used in presenting the inmate’s complaint under

Bradley v. Brown.

Constitutional law specific to grievance procedures for children is limited, but many cases have approved various forms of grievance procedures. The basic elements of adequate procedures are notice to the children of the availability, purpose, and scope of the procedure; a clear and simple procedure for the child to present a grievance to staff; prompt investigation of the grievance; an opportunity for the child to present the grievance to an impartial panel; notice to the child of the panel’s decision; appropriate disciplinary sanctions to staff if the grievance is found justified; and written records of the procedure and final action.

Issues Arising in Institutional Litigation, part 6 of 8: Environment

Environment

Unsanitary and inhumane environmental conditions may violate inmates’ rights under the 8th and 14th amendments (see Hopowit v. Spellman, McCord v. Maggio, Jones v. Diamond, and Carver v. Knox County, Tennessee). Environmental issues may arise if children are housed in inadequate, dilapidated, or unhygienic physical surroundings (see Inmates of Boys Training School v. Affleck, Ahrens v. Thomas, and Thomas v. Mears).

Sanitation

There should be no sewage backup in sleeping quarters, and the area should be free of insects and rodents. The living area should be clean and comply with local and state sanitation regulations. Thus, Ramos v. Lamm found constitutional violations at a prison with poor ventilation, fungus and mold, poor drainage, sewage accumulation, rodent and insect infestation, missing tiles/hard-to-clean bathroom areas, exposed wiring, broken windows, inadequate laundry facilities, deteriorating conditions, and inadequate maintenance. Along the same line, McCord v. Maggio held that lack of funds was not a justification for requiring inmates to live in cells where sewage backup created squalid and unsanitary conditions. Hygiene. Children in custody should be provided with adequate supplies for personal hygiene and should be given an opportunity to shower daily, change their clothing reasonably often, and have fresh bed linens on a weekly basis under Ahrens v. Thomas and Inmates of Boys Training School v. Affleck.

Food

Institutions housing children must provide a balanced diet, with three meals each day and snacks at night. Food should be prepared in accord with public health standards. Food should not be old or moldy; there should not be evidence of insects, rodents, or bad sanitation; and inmate workers should be trained in food preparation and storage (see Ramos v. Lamm). Food should never be withheld from children for disciplinary reasons (see Ahrens v. Thomas and Inmates of Boys Training School v. Affleck). Ventilation, heating, and cooling. Housing inmates in units with inadequate ventilation and air flow is unconstitutional according to Hopowit v. Spellman and Brock v. Warren County, Tennessee. Inadequate ventilation, heating, and cooling may violate inmates’ constitutional right to adequate shelter under Ramos v. Lamm, Ahrens v. Thomas, Henderson v. De Robertis, and Del Raine v. Williford. The Court has also recognized that involuntary exposure to unreasonable environmental tobacco smoke may violate the constitution (see Helling v. McKinney).

Fire Safety

This is a critical area since failure to adequately provide for fire safety may be a matter of life or death (see Hopowit v. Spellman). The facility must have smoke-monitoring devices, a written evacuation plan with posted diagrams for inmates and staff, at least two fire escape routes, fire extinguishers, and lights marking the fire exits (see Ahrens v. Thomas). 

Lighting

The courts have not required specific levels of candle power, but professional standards require that lighting be sufficient for detainees to comfortably read books in their cells without eyestrain (see Hopowit v. Spellman, Ramos v. Lamm, McCord v. Maggio, and Jones v. Diamond). Juvenile cases addressing lighting include Ahrens v. Thomas and Inmates of Boys Training School v. Affleck.

Clothing/Personal Appearance

Children have a right to clean clothing under Inmates of Boys Training School v. Affleck. Clothing should be appropriate for the season, and children should be able to wear clothing similar to that worn by children in the community (see Thomas v. Mears). Also, restrictions on personal appearance that are unrelated to penological interests may violate prisoners’ privacy rights (see Quinn v. Nix on  striking down a prohibition on shag hairstyles).

Overcrowding

This is a critical issue because it is related to so many others. The effects of overcrowding permeate every aspect of institutional operation, including health issues, education, suicidal and assaultive behavior, and overreliance on restraints and disciplinary measures. Under the constitutional standard, the due process clause is violated where children are held under conditions that amount to punishment (see Gary H. v. Hegstrom and Bell v. Wolfish).

In measuring overcrowding against constitutional standards, the courts look not at overcrowding per se but at its impact upon conditions in the institution. Rhodes v. Chapman stands for the proposition that doublecelling itself is not unconstitutional but that it is a factor to be taken into account with other prison conditions affecting essential needs (see Wilson v. Seiter). Thus, in Nami v. Fauver juveniles in the administrative segregation unit of a youth correctional facility could claim constitutional violations when they were double-celled in poorly ventilated, 80-square-foot rooms with only one bed, with violent or psychologically disturbed felons who abused them. Similarly, in Hall v. Dalton the court found constitutional inadequacies in a city jail where an adult inmate spent 40 days in a windowless, two-person cell that held four, with only 14 square feet per person, where meals were served in the cells, where there was little opportunity for exercise, and where the inmates had to sleep on the floor (see the additional adult cases of Tillery v. Owens, Balla v. Board of Corrections, Fisher v. Koehler, Baker v. Holden, Feliciano v. Colon, Stone v. City and County of San Francisco, Young v. Keohane, and Williams v. Griffin).

There is also case law on overcrowding-related issues such as sleeping conditions. Several cases specifically hold that assigning pretrial detainees to sleep on mattresses on the floor violates the due process clause (see Lareau v. Manson, Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, and Lyons v. Powell). Similarly, courts have ruled on overcrowding in juvenile facilities as it relates to program effectiveness, physical plant, staff, security, and other conditions of confinement (see Alexander S. v. Boyd and A.J. v. Kierst). Where overpopulation has an impact upon the availability of health and mental health services, educational programs, and recreation; institutional violence; suicide attempts; and situations requiring the use of force or restraints, the courts may find a violation of the 14th amendment. In addition, courts may find that the constitution is violated where overpopulation means that children spend most of their waking hours locked in their rooms because of inadequate staff to supervise day rooms or recreational activities. Courts around the country have imposed population caps to alleviate overcrowding, even when officials claimed that overcrowding was a result of budgetary constraints (see Alberti v. Sheriff of Harris County, Texas). In a recent juvenile institutional case, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals ordered that no juvenile detention facilities may accept children beyond their licensed capacity, no child may be held in detention longer than 30 days pending disposition of his or her case, and no child may be held longer than 14 days pending post-disposition placement in an appropriate setting. In addition, the court ordered that detention centers must adopt modified versions of the American Bar Association’s detention standards at intake (see Facilities Review Panel v.  Coe).

The Prison Reform Litigation Act of 1995 limits the permissible remedies in cases involving prison conditions and imposes special requirements on prisoner release orders. Nonetheless, relief may still be granted to remedy overcrowding, consistent with the provisions of the act.

Searches

Incarcerated individuals retain some privacy rights. In Bell v. Wolfish, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a determination of whether body cavity searches may be conducted requires balancing the need for a particular search with the invasion of personal rights. For example, adult inmates are entitled to some protection against exposure of their genitals to persons of the opposite gender (see Arey v. Robinson, Lee v. Downs, and Hayes v. Marriott). Similarly, random, suspicionless, clothed searches of female inmates have been found unconstitutional in Jordan v. Gardner. Also, blanket policies allowing strip searches of all detained persons represent an unconstitutional intrusion into personal rights (see Chapman v. Nichols, Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, Giles v. Ackerman, Ward v. County of San Diego, and Thompson v. Souza on recognizing qualified immunity of officials for visual body cavity searches and urine tests of prisoners preselected for prior drug involvement and Thompson v. City of Los Angeles on holding that grand theft auto is sufficiently associated with violence to justify a strip search based on the charge itself).

Courts have remained protective in cross-gender searches of female inmates, disapproving practices such as random, clothed body searches of female inmates by male guards in Jordan v. Gardner and body cavity searches of females in the presence of male officers in Bonitz v. Fair. Even patdown searches of male inmates by female staff violates inmate rights if improperly conducted (see Watson v. Jones). In some situations, male inmates enjoy fewer protections than females. The courts have recognized that female guards may conduct visual body cavity searches of male inmates, and may supervise male prisoners disrobing, showering, and using the toilets under Grummet v. Rushen, Somers v. Thorman, and  Johnson v. Phelan.

Issues Arising in Institutional Litigation, part 5 of 8: Training

Training

Over the past decade, courts have ruled on the liability of institutional administrators and supervisors for a wide range of conduct relating to the hiring, training, supervising, assigning, directing, and retaining of staff. Liability may be imposed if supervisors hire unqualified people, fail to train staff adequately, fail to supervise staff on the job, fail to provide staff with formal policy and procedural guidelines, or fail to fire unfit staff. These issues typically arise in cases where injuries or death have occurred and staff have not been trained to handle suicidal children or medical emergencies.


Failure to properly hire or train personnel may constitute indifference to the rights or safety of others and may support liability for punitive damages under Smith v. Wade. This case is particularly relevant where there is a governmental pattern of deliberate indifference resulting in injury to the plaintiff (see Partridge v. Two Unknown Police Officers of the City of Houston, Texas, and McKenna v. City of Memphis). The right to properly trained staff is well established. Thus, in Garrett v. Rader, where the plaintiff’s developmentally disabled daughter died in restraints administered by untrained staff, the defendants were not permitted to claim qualified immunity. Under City of Canton, Ohio, v. Harris, a failure to train employees may also form the basis for municipal liability in federal civil rights litigation. The issue is whether the training program is adequate and, if it is not, whether the inadequate training can justifiably be said to represent city policy. Thus, in Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, the city’s policy or custom of not training its officers to deal with suicidal inmates amounted to deliberate indifference to inmates’ serious medical needs. Similarly, Gobel v. Maricopa County holds that a government entity may be liable for the failure to train properly its employees if there is a connection between the violation of civil rights and the inadequate training (see Davis v. Mason County and Young v. Augusta, Georgia).